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Submission to the Productivity Commission Issues Paper  
Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure 
Commercial and Property Law Research Centre 
Queensland University of Technology 
Response to issues raised on Personal and Corporate Insolvency Regimes  
The Commission has been asked to identify appropriate options for reducing entry and exit barriers 
including advice on the potential impacts of the personal/corporate insolvency regimes on business 
exits. 
1. There is a ‘close relationship between economic results and legal solutions’ in the field of 
insolvency.1 Insolvency law finally allocates the losses in the event of financial failure of a 
business. It also provides the backdrop against which a business rescue is attempted in the 
twilight zone of a business approaching insolvency. It underpins the commercial and financial 
dealings in a market economy2 and the choices it makes are also a crucial indicator of the 
attitudes and fundamental values of the state’s legal system.3 Nevertheless, insolvency law is 
not merely of economic significance to the community.4 It is intimately linked to the commercial, 
financial and social fabric of a state, being an important contributor to the state’s commercial 
and economic processes and an important component of the state’s general commercial laws.5 
2. A national approach to personal and corporate insolvency and restructuring is justified by the 
close relationship between economic results and insolvency regulation.  In the context of cross-
border or international insolvencies, Professor Westbrook, University of Texas, Austin, refers to 
‘market symmetry’, that is ‘the requirement that some systems in a legal regime must be 
symmetrical with the market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that 
market with respect to the legal rights and duties embraced by those systems.’6 He notes that it 
is: 
unsurprising that virtually every country has established a national [insolvency] regime 
co-extensive with its national market. Most tellingly, as with intellectual property law, 
virtually all federated countries, including those (like the United States) that give 
                                                          
1 Burman HS, ‘Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective’ (1996) 64 Fordham 
Law Review 2543 at 2548. 
2 Wood PR, Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007 at 1.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Warren E, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775; Gross K, Failure and 
Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997.   
5 See the guiding principles adopted in the Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, 
Report No 45, vol 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988 at [33]. The World Bank’s 
Principles on the Legal Framework for Corporate Insolvency state they should ‘integrate with a country’s 
broader legal and commercial systems’: World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditors’ Rights Systems, 2001 at Principle 6.  
6 Westbrook JL, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2276 at 2283. 
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considerable autonomy to regions (states) in business and commercial matters, nonetheless 
insist that the [insolvency] regime be national, to fit the national dimensions of the market.7  
However as we point out below in respect of Q 30 and sanctions in personal insolvency or 
bankruptcy, there can be differences between states and territories due to the differing 
regulation affecting, for example, employment of an undischarged or former bankrupt.  
28. To what extent do the existing insolvency arrangements facilitate or hinder business 
closure? Are these arrangements a disincentive to business set-up? How do these 
arrangements affect the choice of business structure?  
3. In light of the increasing complexity of issues surrounding business failure and rescue, including 
for international business, we submit there are benefits in a merged regulatory architecture of 
personal and corporate insolvency and a combined personal and corporate insolvency regulator. 
The issue has been considered over the years, notably in the 2004 Corporate Insolvency Law 
Stocktake8 and was recommended by a Senate Committee in 2010.9 The AFSA submission to the 
FSI10 provides a useful overview of the insolvency frameworks in a number of jurisdictions 
compared to Australia.  For the small business entrepreneur,11 risk factors impacting the choice 
of business structure would include insolvency – operating as a sole trader potentially brings the 
personal insolvency regime into play with the particular personal impact that may bring;12 
whereas operating through a company would invoke the corporate insolvency regime. 
Differences still exist between these regimes, despite attempts at harmonisation through the 
proposed ILRB 2014. If a corporate structure is used in combination with personal guarantees by 
the ‘owners’, then concurrent personal and corporate insolvency administrations may come into 
play.  
4. We suggest that there is a lack of data available to assist with addressing these questions under 
Q 28.  However, a lack of data available on corporate insolvency has been continually noted in 
almost every Parliamentary report at least since the 1988 Australian Law Reform Commission 
Report No. 45, The General Insolvency Inquiry, commonly known as the Harmer Report. See also 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Report, Corporate 
Insolvency Laws: A Stocktake (2004) which identified [at 12.64] a ‘paucity of contemporary 
systematic comparative information and empirical data on the operation of corporate insolvency 
                                                          
7 Westbrook JL, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2276 at 2284. 
8 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2004, Corporate Insolvency Laws: a 
Stocktake, at [12.73] ff; Productivity Commission 2010, Annual Review of Regulatory Burdens on Business: 
Business and Consumer Services Research Report, at 175. 
9 Senate Economics References Committee 2010, The regulation, registration and remuneration of insolvency 
practitioners in Australia: the case for a new framework 
10 http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/09/Australian_Financial_Security_Authority.pdf  
11 Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is being addressed by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) “aimed at reducing the legal obstacles encountered by micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) throughout their life cycle”: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1MSME.html . Policy issues include 
insolvency. 
12 The World Bank, Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, Working Group on the Treatment of 
the Insolvency of Natural Persons, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/WBInsolvencyOfNaturalPersonsReport_01_11_13.pdf.    
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laws’ and also Recommendation 58 at [12.72]. The Senate Economics References Committee in 
The regulation, registration, and remuneration of insolvency practitioners in Australia: the case 
for a new framework (2010) Chapter 9 notes the ‘familiar theme’ of the call for better data at 
[9.3] – [9.7]. The conclusion on insolvency data was that the Committee ‘strongly agrees’ that 
the lack of data needs to be ‘addressed in a comprehensive way’.  
If the government wishes to improve our personal and corporate insolvency regimes, it first 
needs to invest in finding out, in a rigorous and informed way, how the current law operates. 
Until it is prepared to make such an investment and while instead it relies upon the anecdotal 
(often from well-meaning but ultimately inadequately informed participants and others) it 
cannot be sure that the insolvency regime we have provides the most effective regime to 
underpin Australia’s commercial and financial dealings, nor that any change is justified.  
5. The broad operation of the Australian personal and corporate insolvency regimes is not 
something that can be dealt with in this brief submission. The last comprehensive review of the 
insolvency system was by the Australian Law Reform Commission (the Harmer Report) and was 
handed down in 1988. Whilst there have been aspects of our insolvency laws that have been 
reviewed since that time, none has been able to provide the clear and comprehensive analysis 
that is able to come from a more considered review. Such a review ought to be conducted by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission or similar independent panel set up for the task.13   
There has been significant piecemeal commentary on our current system by governmental 
committees in the time since 1988 which adds to the problem of not fitting all of the pieces of 
the insolvency puzzle together. Fundamentally the fitting together of the personal and corporate 
regimes needs to be better undertaken than it is currently. If some changes are proposed their 
full impact across the broad insolvency regime needs to be considered. So for example, if a more 
debtor-friendly restructuring regime is advocated, what are the implications for individual 
director who is also perhaps a debtor of major lenders to the company? And what of the issue of 
secured creditors and their power in respect of corporate rescue- how is that to be dealt with? 
What is needed is a form of review that will provide the comprehensive analysis that has been 
lacking since 1988. We have a template for what can be done based on the Harmer Report (or 
even the Cork Report from the UK). Anything less than that is likely to lead to nothing more than 
superficial tinkering. It almost goes without saying that there has been an enormous change in 
the way in which business is operated and financed since 1988 with the developments in capital 
markets and the growth in secured credit so that examination of possible fundamental change is 
well overdue. In this context, it is noted that in 2013 Singapore conducted a holistic review of its 
insolvency regime14 and on 25 August 2014 the Senior Minister of State for Law, Indranee Rajah, 
announced that Singapore is enacting major reforms of its insolvency laws as “Singapore tries to 
position itself as a regional hub for insolvency work and debt restructuring”.  
                                                          
13 The impact of such comprehensive law reform discussion is evident, for example, albeit in the New Zealand 
context, in a NZ Supreme Court decision of 18 February 2015 dealing with voidable transactions. In Allied 
Concrete Ltd v Meltzer [2015] NZSC 7 there were frequent references not only to the New Zealand Law 
Commission but also by Elias CJ to the Australian Law Reform Commission General Insolvency Inquiry Report. 





29. Is the underlying incentive structure within the corporate and personal insolvency 
arrangements able to effectively and efficiently facilitate business closure without 
discouraging new business set-ups? Where should the balance lie between creditors and 
debtors in the arrangements? Are there feasible alternatives to the existing corporate 
insolvency arrangements? Is the use of safe harbour provisions for firms seeking to 
restructure a feasible alternative?  
6. On the existing corporate insolvency arrangements, we propose that the comprehensive review 
of the insolvency system should reconsider the need for the option of secured creditor 
receiverships to continue – in particular as they may run concurrently with voluntary 
administrations. Australia provides a prominent position to dominant secured creditors. While it 
is important to recognise secured credit in our insolvency regime, there are different ways of 
treating secured credit. We propose that any comprehensive review of the insolvency regime 
should consider to what extent can/should secured creditors have their rights 
suspended/reduced where a corporate rescue is being proposed.  The position of secured credit 
has been debated extensively in academic literature15 and the question has been asked whether 
the power granted to secured creditors is justified or whether it simply comes at the expense of 
the unsecured. In 2002, the UK abolished administrative receivership in almost all 
circumstances. Qualifying holders of floating charges created on or after 15 September 2003 
were no longer able to appoint a receiver, but could instead put the company into 
administration. It has been suggested that rise of the “pre-pack” process in the UK has been a 
response to this loss of power by the dominant secured creditor.16  What this demonstrates is 
the potential for change to one part of the insolvency regime (or even the broader commercial 
law) to have an effect in another part. This again reinforces the need for a wide comprehensive 
review so that all matters are covered.  
7. Additional issues which have been canvassed over some time for law reform in Australia and 
which are relevant to this inquiry include: 
• The impact of the insolvency regime on the availability of post-commencement financing to 
facilitate the salvaging of economic value;  
• The potentially devastating effect of ipso facto clauses on business rescue, as was evident in 
the collapse of the telecommunications retailer, One Tel; and  
• The current settings of the insolvent trading laws which may act as a disincentive to rescue a 
business in the twilight zone approaching potential insolvency.  
  
                                                          
15 LoPucki L, ‘The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain‘ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1887; Westbrook J, ‘The Control 
of Wealth in Bankruptcy’ (2004) 82 4 Texas Law Review 795; Armour, John, ‘The Law and Economics Debate 
About Secured Lending: Lessons for European Lawmaking?’ (2008) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118030>; Armour J, Hsu A and Walters A, ‘The costs 
and benefits of secured creditor control in bankruptcy: evidence from the UK’ (2012) 8 Review of Law and 
Economics 101. 
16 See Armour J, ‘The rise of the  ‘Pre-Pack’: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform’ in 
Austin R and Aoun F (eds), Restructuring Companies in Troubled Times: Director and Creditor Perspectives, Ross 
Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Taxation Law, University of Sydney, 2012, at 61. 
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30. How should the sanctions in personal insolvency or bankruptcy apply to individuals? For 
how long should these sanctions around bankruptcy apply? Are these sanctions a 
disincentive for entrepreneurial activity? Is there adequate enforcement of the existing 
sanctions? Are there feasible alternatives to the current bankruptcy process?  
8. Key sanctions imposed through the personal insolvency and bankruptcy regime include the 
obligation on individuals to disclose an undischarged bankruptcy (or current debt agreement) to 
creditors when applying for credit above the threshold amount (currently $5,398);17 the 
obligation on individuals in business to disclose their bankruptcy to the persons with whom they 
have business dealings (unless they are operating the business under their own name);18 the 
accessibility of information about current and previous insolvency administrations through the 
National Personal Insolvency Index (a permanent, public record); and specific occupational 
restrictions on persons who have used bankruptcy laws.  The extent to which these sanctions do 
impact adversely on individuals, including in the context of business continuations and business 
start-ups, is not known, and is another area where research is needed. Provisional statistics from 
the Australian Financial Security Authority show that 4,391 bankruptcies in 2013-2014 
(approximately 22%) were business related bankruptcies, where the bankruptcy was directly 
related to the debtor’s proprietary interest in a business.19 The sanctions imposed during 
bankruptcy, and in some cases after discharge of bankruptcy, are likely to make it difficult on 
these debtors to continue in business, or to start a new business after discharge from 
bankruptcy.  
9. The obligations to disclose bankruptcy status is imposed only during the period of bankruptcy. 
However, with a minimum period of three years,20 Australia’s bankruptcy laws are more 
restrictive than similar countries, including the United Kingdom, which in 2004 reduced the 
bankruptcy period to a minimum of one year,21 in part to foster enterprise through ‘responsible 
risk-taking’.22 The changes were introduced as part of the Enterprise Act in that country, 
reflecting the focus for the changes. In Australia, the short-lived experiment with early discharge 
has not been repeated, perhaps reflecting a different approach to facilitating entrepreneurship 
and a fresh start than has occurred in the UK.  
10. In terms of the permanent public record of bankruptcy and other insolvency arrangements 
through the NPII, this has the potential to impact on employment and business start-ups, as 
there is currently little restriction on access to this information (as long as the prescribed fee is 
paid). Nor is there any restriction on how such insolvency information can be used by a potential 
employer, client or contractor.  
11. Business start-ups and employment prospects generally are also likely to be adversely affected 
by various professional and occupational restrictions that are imposed on persons who have 
become bankrupt. In a wide range of occupations, persons who have previously been bankrupt 
are prevented from participating, either during the period of bankruptcy or for a period 
                                                          
17 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s269(1)(a) – ab). 
18 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s269(1)(b). 
19 Australian Financial Security Authority, Provisional business and non-business personal insolvency time series 
December 2014 update. 
20 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s149. 
21 Insolvency Act 1986 UK, s279. 
22 See discussion in Adrian Walters, ‘Personal insolvency law after the Enterprise Act: an appraisal’, 2004 
(available from researchgate.net). 
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extending beyond the bankruptcy. Occupational sectors affected by restrictions including 
various building trades; property, stock and business agents; the mining sector; the racing 
sector; valuers; security agents; and motor trades, as well as accountants, taxation agency, 
insolvency professionals and others.  In some cases, there is a mandatory exclusion. In other 
cases, there is a discretion available to the decision maker (if, for example, the person had taken 
steps to avoid the bankruptcy). And in other cases, a previous bankruptcy is one of the factors 
that can be considered in determining whether the person is ‘a fit and proper person’. There is 
considerable variations in these occupational restrictions, and where the occupation is regulated 
at the State/Territory level, there is also variations even within a particular occupation.  In 
addition, there is considerable variation in the extent to which other insolvency administrations 
(debt agreements, personal insolvency agreements) are also associated with occupational 
restrictions.  
12. Finding information about the applicable restrictions is no easy task; AFSA’s website provides a 
list of some of the occupations potentially affected by bankruptcy or other insolvency 
administrations, but notes that “It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive listing 
and you are encouraged to contact the relevant licensing authority or professional body to 
obtain further information.”23 
13. All of these sanctions and restrictions potentially act as a barrier to employment, to the ‘fresh 
start’ that is a goal of bankruptcy, and to business continuations and start-ups. Australia’s 
minimum bankruptcy is long compared to other similar jurisdictions, and is unlikely to assist in 
encouraging entrepreneurship. The impact of bankruptcy (and other insolvency administrations) 
on employment and business is not easily identifiable, and work is needed to identify a coherent 
and consistent policy objective for imposing occupational restrictions upon current and former 
bankrupts. We do not suggest that these restrictions should necessarily be removed or reduced; 
but rather a detailed analysis needs to be made of the rationale for restrictions, and the 
appropriate length, so as to ensure that there is the scope for consistent and rational decision 
making in this area, as well as greater certainty for individuals considering their insolvency 
options.   
 
31. Are the insolvency arrangements able to transfer assets and capital effectively? Are 
insolvency procedures timely to ensure assets do not become ‘stranded’ and unable to be 
used elsewhere?  
14. We submit that it is questionable whether the current insolvency laws allow for the 
identification of the business that is to be saved through a legislative corporate rescue regime? 
Business textbooks24 do identify the economic/business factors to look for but are they able to 
be incorporated into our legal rules? Generally speaking they are not. In our system we leave 
this largely to the professional expertise of the voluntary administrator. There is anecdotal 
evidence perhaps that the focus of the rescue regime, operating as it does in the shadow of 
liquidation, places too much focus on the legal responsibilities of directors and not enough on 
business conditions. The ability to rescue is often dependent upon the appointment at the 
                                                          
23 https://www.afsa.gov.au/debtors/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-overview/employment-income-contributions 




correct time. The key issue is what are the barriers to the appointment of an administrator at an 
early enough stage to allow the business issues to be dealt with? In this respect examination of 
the insolvent trading prohibitions, the Australian Taxation Office powers and practice in 
collecting its debts, the independence obligations of  insolvency practitioners and the voluntary 
administration process all need to be looked at in a holistic manner. There may be other matters 
as well which are factors influencing the ability to transfer assets and capital effectively. This is 
why a broad based examination of the insolvency laws needs to be undertaken if we are to move 
forward.  
32. Is the insolvency process unnecessarily costly and lengthy? How might this additional cost 
be measured? Is it simply a transfer between participants in the process or does it 
represent a loss in the overall efficiency of the economy?  
15. On the issue of costs fundamentally we have (as with so many other areas around insolvency) no 
adequate data to make an informed judgement. One of the few pieces of credible information in 
this respect is research by Mark Wellard which has produced data showing that for small 
companies in his data set undertaking Deeds of Company Arrangement (DOCA), the median 
remuneration was $31,500 for both the period of the voluntary administration and the DOCA.25 
As an absolute set of figures it does not suggest outrageous overcharging. This is however a 
relatively small sample26 and is confined to small companies. What might be asked though is 
whether it is excessive? The answer to that must be that we do not know because we have no 
alternative with which we can make a comparison. The conditions under which each business is 
placed in its insolvency procedure are unique and we cannot compare it to what might have 
been the cost if they had operated under some other legislative regime. If it is desired to make 
some comparison with overseas jurisdictions then we do need to consider a large number of 
factors.  We might also keep in mind the comment by Lubben27 that: 
The professional fees are the cost of moving to [a] higher recovery. The notion that money 
paid to professionals belongs to creditors is true only if the creditors could realize that value 
without the professionals. 
Thus the real question is not what the costs are in absolute terms but whether they are value for 
money in the sense that they add to the return achieved. Again it is very difficult to know what 
the relevant costs vis-à-vis the returns to creditors are because we have no real data.  
33. Are there legal impediments to reforms in this area, such as relying on alternative forms of 
dispute resolution (appellable administrative decisions, tribunals or alternative dispute 
resolution based solutions) for simple or uncontested matters? Are there any barriers to 
innovation by insolvency practitioners?  
16. Regarding the regulation of insolvency practitioners and the potential barriers, there is 
substantial room for innovation in thinking about ways of dealing with dissatisfaction. We 
recommend recent research by members of our Centre applying audit expectation gap theory to 
                                                          
25 Wellard M, ‘A Review of Deeds of Company Arrangement’ (2014) 26 (2) Australian Insolvency Journal 12 at 
14.  
26 This involved 41 DOCAs classed as “small” for which data could be obtained for both the voluntary 
administration period and the DOCA period. 
27 Lubben S, ‘What we “know” about Chapter 11 cost is wrong’ (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law 141 at 144. 
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the insolvency context as relevant to evaluating the regulation of the insolvency profession and 
whether the current settings are appropriate.28 Once again, these questions can be raised as 
part of a comprehensive review of the personal and corporate insolvency regimes.  
42. Should governments provide incentives, such as grants, through the tax system and 
insolvency arrangements, to increase the willingness of individuals and businesses to take 
on risk and innovate?  
17. Taxation considerations are relevant when considering the effectiveness of Australia’s personal 
and corporate insolvency regimes.  Taxation legislation impacts in numerous ways on the 
effective operation of insolvency laws generally.29 It may well be that we can offer more by way 
of incentive for innovation by improving the insolvency regime than by offering some tax 
incentives. The US has a culture of recognising failed business entities as the opportunity to start 
again. No doubt our economy may well benefit from such a culture change but whether that 
could be obtained by changing the law is open to debate. Certainly we might look to the power 
granted to major creditors –such as the banks and ironically the ATO - in insolvencies and ask if 
we reduce that within our laws might we assist in the development of an entrepreneurial 
culture. Again however any change needs to be well thought through after a more 
comprehensive consideration along the lines of the Harmer Report.   
Dr Colin Anderson 
Ms Nicola Howell 
Professor Rosalind Mason 
Members of the Insolvency & Restructuring Group 
Commercial & Property Law Research Centre 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
26 February 2015 
                                                          
28 Anderson, C and Brown, C, ‘Mind the insolvency gap: Lessons to be learned from audit expectations gap 
theory’ (2014) 22 Insolvency Law Journal 178.  
29 See for example, Brown C, Anderson C, Morrison D, ‘The certainty of tax in insolvency: Where does the ATO 
fit?’ (2011) 19(2) Insolvency Law Journal 108. 
